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For those who imagine a somewhat 
distorted personality lying behind 
Kierkegaard’s authorship, vol. XXV 
of Kierkegaard’s Writings will come 
as a healthy shock. Letters and do­
cuments, translated into English for 
the first time, give a picture of 
someone extremely well-balanced
and in active communication with 
all kinds of people. In these pages, 
broken engagement and bishop at­
tack lose any exaggerated emphasis 
as we meet a man very much con­
cerned about the feelings and wel­
fare of others, whether it is the little 
boy accidentally forced to walk too 
fast, the Queen who had not re­
ceived a copy of one of his books, 
or a severely crippled cousin (Let­
ters 195, 295, 196). While the do­
cuments provide an excellent com­
mentary on all the phases of his life, 
giving us, among other things, valu­
able information about his school 
and university career, the letters 
from and to Kierkegaard supply an 
exciting and humorous source of 
material, not only about Kierke­
gaard and his family, but about his 
Copenhagen contemporaries, about, 
for example, the Heibergs, Law Pro­
fessor Kolderup-Rosenvinge and the 
philosopher F. C. Sibbern. In addi­
tion, there are, besides full notes and 
index, an historical introduction, an 
ample Kierkegaard chronology, 
extra items about his family and
clear maps of 19th century Copen­
hagen and Denmark, all of which 
furnish the reader with essential 
back-up information about the 
people and places mentioned.
Whereas it can be taken for gran­
ted that Letters and Documents will 
be of immense interest and value to 
scholar and general reader alike, the 
publication of vols. VIII and XIX 
may raise some eyebrows. Why re­
translate Begrebet Angest and Syg- 
dommen til Døden? After all, Wal­
ter Lowrie, pioneer Kierkegaard 
translator of Angest and Sygdom­
men, hoped that the 1954 revision 
of Sickness was ‘an impeccable 
translation’, so why waste money 
on superfluity? Indeed, since these 
two psychological works on angst, 
sin and despair have been on the 
market for years, surely it can be 
argued that even a review of them 
is waste of space. -  Every Kierke­
gaard interested person has read 
them long ago.
Anyone examining the retransla­
tions will realize at once that they 
are of course anything but super­
fluous, and while the contents of the 
two works need no mention here, 
much can be said about them as 
translations. Firstly, it can be said 
that they are part of an edition in 
which agreement has been reached 
on the translation of Kierkegaard 
terminology. Despite the fact of 
different translators, the reader can 
be confident that ‘Virkelighed’ and
‘Realitet’, for example, will consi­
stently appear as ‘actuality’ and 
‘reality’ and that it will be clearly 
indicated whether ‘existence’ trans­
lates ‘Existents’ or ‘Tilværelse’. Se­
condly, with the greatest respect to 
Walter Lowrie, to whom so much is 
owed, it has to be admitted that the 
time has more than come for radical 
retranslation in the uniform edition 
of Kierkegaard's Writings.
Fresh work on these two books 
has in fact done a great deal to 
clarify the text through remedying 
errors and omissions. For example, 
‘Elverpigen der er huul bagtil’, pre­
viously translated ‘the fairies, which 
are empty silhouettes’, now becomes 
‘the elf maid who is hollow seen 
from the back’ (Lowrie, Dread 119, 
line 20, KW  VIII 134, line 8) and 
‘Fortvivlelsen’, ‘despair’, accidental­
ly overlooked in the Lowrie revi­
sion, is now restored to the text 
(KW XIX 78, line 30, cf. Lowrie, 
Sickness 209, line 31). While expla­
natory and sometimes incorrect ad­
ditions are removed, for example, 
Lowrie’s ‘nothing to do’ and ‘to the 
point of’ (Lowrie, Dread 145, line 
23 and Sickness 201, line 11, cf. KW  
VIII 162, line 20, and KW  XIX 67, 
line 21), there is modernization of 
Lowrie language in contexts where 
Kierkegaard is not himself using an 
old-fashioned word, e.g. ‘nødven­
digt’ is now translated as ‘necessary’ 
instead of ‘requisite’ (KW XIX 37, 
line 1, Lowrie, Sickness 170, line 3).
The new translations are thus ex­
cellent, an enormous improvement 
on the old, but does this mean that 
they will deserve the label ‘impec­
cable’? When speaking of perfection, 
the answer is of course in the nega­
tive. No human project, let alone 
translation, is ever absolutely per­
fect, and the only good Kierkegaard 
translator is the one who, like Low- 
rie himself in his time, is but striving 
towards that goal. Howard Hong 
never tires of telling the story of his 
overlooked misprint when contemp­
lating ‘cod’ in a tank became con­
templating ‘God’ in a tank, and of 
course scholars are going to continue 
to discuss translations, assert error, 
argue about key Kierkegaard 
words. -  The battle will continue as 
to whether ‘Angest5 should be trans­
lated ‘dread5 or ‘anxiety5, whether 
‘opbyggelige5 should be ‘edifying5 or 
‘upbuilding5.
To help the battling scholar, the 
scholar using English and Danish 
texts, and the ordinary reader, these 
retranslations, like vol. XIV, Two 
Ages, and Letters and Documents, 
give valuable editorial material. In 
vols. VIII and XIX there is cross- 
referencing using all three Danish 
editions of the Samlede Vterker, Da­
nish pagination in the margin of the 
main text, translation in the text of 
Latin, Greek and other foreign tags, 
historical introduction, supplemen­
tary material from Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers and the most
copious and instructive notes pos­
sible. Thus, one must not only praise 
this new series for its translation and 
notes, one must also applaud the 
fact that the reader is encouraged to 
consult original texts. No translation 
is ‘impeccable5, as every translator 
discovers, but there is the top trans­
lation category of ‘almost impec­
cable5, and in my mind there is no 
doubt whatsoever that all three 
translations, together with Two Ages 
and the Journals and Papers that 




THE GRAMMAR OF FAITH.
San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978,
212 pp.
Professor Holmer’s book is an im­
portant contribution to the question 
of the definition and task of theo­
logy, metatheology, if you will. Still 
it is a contribution that is hard to 
evaluate for several reasons.
First, the very concept of meta­
theology is different from theologi­
cal method. We are familiar with 
Biblical, historical and systematic 
theology and recognize these as dif­
ferent from each other as much by 
method as by content. Then too, 
there are a whole host of other ef­
forts, practical theology, theology of
pastoral care, etc. Mostly these are 
-  well what are they? Case studies? 
How-to methods? The churchly arm 
of psychotherapy? Well, theology 
they are not, and Holmer’s effort is 
none of these. His is rather a study 
which attempts to distinguish theo­
logy as living language in a living 
community from many other intel­
lectual activities, theological and 
philosophical. Thus the major thrust 
of his book is negative, and only in 
the last chapter does he begin to set 
forth his own positive views.
Another reason why the book is 
difficult to characterize is the vir­
tual lack of notation. This omission 
is very a la mode, Kierkegaardian, 
Wittgensteinian, analytic and diffi­
cult to penetrate. Of course, the 
author has a right to make demands 
on a reader, but tit for tat. The rea­
der has expectations of the author 
and fuller notation and referral 
would have enabled the reader to 
see the aim of Holmer’s criticism 
more clearly. As it is there are nu­
merous times when I think he may 
be referring to X, but I am not en­
tirely sure. A few footnotes would 
have created a lot of certainty. The 
other side of this coin is that Hol- 
mer is a master of allusions. Posi­
tively, this book is the most humor­
ous theology book I have ever read.
Connected to the above is Hol­
mer’s irony, understatement, over­
statement and general rhetorical 
way of writing. He is not above sar­
casm. He enjoys his rhetoric, but to 
characterize a position as »a how­
ler« is neither to clarify nor to re­
fute it. One surmises that Holmer’s 
rarely concealed disdain for a posi­
tion is sometimes confused with rea­
sons for rejecting the position.
Thus far this review reflects the 
book: the negations are first and the 
affirmations are last. However, this 
part is even more difficult, if not 
dangerous, for one can imagine Hol- 
mer good naturedly giving his critic 
the above truisms about his style of 
writing. However to construe an ar­
gument of Holmer as »X« when he 
actually meant »X minus two de­
grees« (to express missing the pre­
cise point geometrically) will, one 
can well imagine, bring down Hol­
mer’s laughter upon his hapless pate. 
But the risk must be taken. Another 
problem with a review at this point 
is that Holmer has promised two 
more volumes; what is criticized 
here as a lacunae may be fully dis­
cussed later. But all one can do is re­
view the book in front of him.
Holmer’s book can be read from 
beginning to end, but the last chap­
ter shows his theological intention 
and so shows the point of his nega­
tive comments in the early chapters. 
Thus it must be understood back­
wards.
In this chapter, Holmer proceeds 
to reject the idea that »God is ob­
jective and can therefore be talked 
about in the same senses that we
write about stars, the crust of the 
earth, people, or animals.« (p. 180) 
He wants to praise the motive of 
such an effort reserving the right to 
criticism. Holmer takes his own 
point of departure from Luther, 
Barth, Kierkegaard and Wittgen­
stein. There is no longer a single, 
universal and comprehensive view 
of logic and rationally applicable 
without qualifications to all do­
mains. At first brush Holmer ap­
pears to opt for a fideism based on 
a »form of life«. One can even sym­
pathize with that judgement, but it 
is false. Rather, Holmer claims that 
there is a logic, or a grammar, if 
you will, of faith, and theology is 
one part of that grammar along 
with prayer, worship, love and 
other things people do, in, about 
and with faith.
There are objective things that can 
be known about theology, like He­
brew verbs and the issues of the 
Christological controversies. But this 
is not the language of faith itself, 
the actually used language of devo­
tion, prayer and sacred teachings. 
The first responsibility of the theo­
logian is to guard the language of 
faith so that it is properly used. His 
activity is possible and necessary 
because there are certain rules about 
the language of faith which in turn 
are supported by a certain mode of 
life. However, note that the gram­
mar is first.
The language of faith is, for Hol-
mer, found paradigmatically in the 
Bible and liturgy. What one does to 
become a Christian is to make one­
self at home in the language of faith 
and adopt the form of life it calls 
for. Theology’s task is to grasp the 
grammar.
Holmer is quite critical of intel­
lectualist attempts to put the mean­
ing of theological concepts into some 
other language game. The problem 
is that these other concepts, for in­
stance emergent evolution, Omega 
point, Ground of Being, etc., have 
to be explained first. In the name of 
economy (not one of Holmer’s 
words) why not go straight to the 
language and life-form of faith? 
That makes good sense.
A bit further on Holmer widens 
his canon and also qualifies it: »The 
Bible, the prayer books, the public 
liturgy, the confessions — these and 
more are, if they have not been end­
lessly tampered with and made 
agreeable to passing whims of the 
age, the formats within which the 
knowledge of God is brought to de­
finition.« (p. 202) A number of 
things puzzle me with this asserta- 
tion.
Fundamentally, my problem is 
that Holmer takes a very nearly 
nonhistorical attitude to historical 
deposits. He seems to be saying: It 
is out of this set of historical depo­
sits that we can determine the gram­
mar of faith, but by and large, in­
terpreting them is no problem. Hoi-
mer seems to forbid us to respond 
in our history to the way others who 
wrote the Bible, the liturgy and the 
confessions responded to their hi­
story when they wrote these items. 
It is as if he were saying, »Don’t 
think about these historical deposits 
historically; think of them theologi­
cally.« But thinking theologically is 
to think in part, at least, histori­
cally. There just isn’t the great dist­
inction between historical and theo­
logical thinking that Holmer insists 
upon.
Further, Holmer when he talks 
about thinking theologically seems 
to be moving in the direction of N. 
F. S. Grundtvig. He writes »... the 
language of faith is kept alive and 
in the edifying use of the Scriptures 
usually in the worship services of 
the churches.« (p. 198, The sentence 
seems awkward.) Holmer’s view 
that »the language of faith is not an 
artificial and contrived tongue« is 
certainly sound. These quotations 
again show Holmer’s attempt to ba­
lance the living word of the form 
of life with the steadiness of a canon 
of historically objective deposits. 
This balance of tradition and on­
going life is emphasized by Holmer, 
but it is not addressed. The problem 
is that even the language of faith 
has a history, is molded and changes 
to some degree historically as new 
peoples, like the Romans or Nige­
rians accept the faith.
It is in view, however, of these
positions that Holmer expresses his 
criticism of the hoary views of 
theism, atheism and metaphysics. 
The distinction of the language of 
faith and language about faith is 
fundamental to Holmer. This di­
stinction is closely related to what 
I take to be his major thesis that the 
language of faith is not observatio­
nal but rather relational language. 
More power to him!
This distinction also leads Holmer 
to be quite critical of all major fads 
in theology. Though in general 
agreement I cannot be quite so cate­
gorical as he. To be sure, process 
theology is a professor’s game and 
it is more dignified and better pay­
ing than welfare. But liberation 
theology is another matter. Holmer 
writes, »The political focus of Chri­
stian concepts is something alto­
gether new and, on the face of it, 
quite questionable. But more of that 
subsequently.« (p. 146) Unfortun­
ately, Holmer never delivers on that 
»subsequently« in this book; perhaps 
he will do so in the promised two 
subsequent volumes.
To say that the »political focus of 
Christian concepts is quite new«, 
may be to say something quite spe­
cific, but one is not sure what is 
meant. Christian concepts have mo­
ved in and out of political focus and 
have influenced political philosophy 
and practise since Constantine. Sure­
ly John 19 and Revelation 17 and 
18 are as clear a denunciation of an
oppressive political system as the 
story of Exodus in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. And it is precisely this 
Scriptural dimension that requires 
we all pay both appreciative atten­
tion to liberation theology on the 
one hand and critical attention so 
that it does not become a mere theo­
logical legitimation of some specific 
political and economic programs 
that could be justified in their own 
terms, or perhaps could not be justi­
fied at all. Furthermore, it is pre­
cisely this suffering determination of 
liberation theology »not to be con­
formed to this world«, not to acqui­
esce in the face of exploitation and 
tyranny: it is this suffering in faith, 
in hope and in love that signifies 
the theological importance of libe­
ration theology and renders Hol- 
mer’s judgment itself questionable. 
For me, the political focus is as 
necessary as »... suffered under Pon­
tius Pilate...«
What my criticisms all turn on is 
the objection that Holmer does not 
appreciate as fully as he should the 
historical and cultural context of his 
own imprecise canon and urges that 
we attempt to appropriate the lan­
guage of faith and its consequent 
form of life as if they were more 
ahistorical and acultural than I take 
them to be. While I have a funda­
mental sympathy with much Hol­
mer says of many time-honored but 
empty philosophical constructs, his 
own canon requires we do theology
politically, historically and cultu­
rally.
Holmer is provocative, madde­
ning, frustrating and rewarding. 
Very rewarding.
Robert L. Perkins
G rete Børsand H eyerdahl: 
IDÉHISTORISKE SMULER.
Oslo: Gyldendal norsk Forlag, En Fakkel- 
bok, 1979, 198 pp.
Denne lille bog med den på en gang 
beskedne og prætentiøse titel er gan­
ske underholdende læsning. Grete 
Børsand Heyerdahl skriver levende 
og (lovlig) meget pædagogisk om 
Hegel, H. C. Andersen, kvindepro­
blemer, Hesse og Søren Kierkegaard, 
og hun ræsonnerer overbevisende. 
Synsvinklen er idealistisk dialektisk, 
inspireret af Hegel og Gadamer, og 
det er jo fuldt legitimt, men det 
medfører ganske naturligt, at K. 
kommer noget til kort, at han me­
dieres ind i den humanistiske tradi­
tion. Paradokset forsvinder lige så 
stille, og tilbage bliver en metafysisk 
K. med kedelige griller.
To af bogens otte afhandlinger 
beskæftiger sig udtrykkelig med K., 
»Kierkegaard, Adorno og »Kjerlig­
hedens Gjerninger«« og »Den filo­
sofiske omvendelse«. Den første på­
tager sig den taknemmelige opgave 
at kritisere Adornos K.-billede. Da 
Adorno ikke har læst K. på original­
sproget, er hans »Kierkegaards Lehre 
von der Liebe« let at afvise eller re­
lativere som en forkyndelse af et 
livssyn over for et andet, men 
spørgsmålet er, om Grete Børsand 
Heyerdahls afvisning af Adorno er 
andet og mere. Mod Adornos frem­
hævelse af det konkrete i næstekær- 
ligheden opstiller hun idealet af en 
almen velvilje -  og tager K. til ind­
tægt for denne drøm uden at se, at 
K/s og evangeliets kærlighedsbud er 
langt radikalere. For K. skal kærlig­
heden ikke forandre verden, men 
budet »Du skal elske din næste« er 
en dom over mennesket, også over 
dets »højere stræben«.
Heyerdahl ser ikke K. som »das 
ganz Andere«, og derfor må hun -  
trods sin omfortolkning af ham -  
kritisere ham, når han angriber He- 
gel. Hvorfor skulle K. latterliggøre 
Heiberg, fordi han kom til hegelia- 
nismen ved en omvendelse (Heiberg: 
Prosaiske Skrifter XI, p. 498ff)? K. 
har flere steder hånet Heiberg for 
ved et spring at komme til den filo­
sofi, der benægter springet, og det er 
Heyerdahl forarget over. For hende 
er enhver tilegnelse af en overbevis­
ning lige så god som den anden, den 
kristne omvendelse, hvor Gud umid­
delbart griber ind og forandrer et 
menneske, og den enkle aha-oplevel- 
se, hvor et menneske får indsigt i et 
andet menneskes tankegang, sidestil­
les, og så er K. naturligvis stemplet 
som fanatiker og hysteriker, når han 
latterliggør Heiberg. Da alle »om­
vendelser« angår forholdet til »det 
absolutte«, så kan de allesammen -  
for »idéhistorikeren« -  være et fedt, 
men da K. ikke forholder sig til det 
abstrakt evige, men til det absurde, 





Eine Auswahl, herausgegeben von Hayo  
Gerdes. Düsseldorf/Köln: Eugen Diederichs 
Verlag, 1980, 357 pp.
Bekanntlich ist es nicht schwierig, 
eine Auswahl aus dem Werk Kierke­
gaards zusammenzustellen, die einen 
überwältigenden Eindruck von sei­
nem Reichtum gibt. Dass Aehnliches 
auch von den Tagebüchern gilt, zeigt 
die vorliegende Auswahl, wenn auch 
das im Werk Geleistete das Entschei­
dende ist und bleiben wird. Die 
Texte dieser Auswahl sind der fünf­
bändigen, 1962-74 im Eugen Diede­
richs Verlag erschienenen Ausgabe der 
Tagebücher entnommen. Sie sind in 
zuverlässiger Weise in gutes Deutsch 
übersetzt, z.B. ohne seltsame Ent- 
welschungen. Die Aufzeichnungen 
sind nicht nach der Reihenfolge 
ihrer Entstehung, sondern nach The­
men ausgewählt und zusammenge­
stellt. Diese Ordnung nach Sach­
gruppen hat sowohl Nachteile wie 
Vorteile. Obwohl mit Gedanken des
jungen Kierkegaards begonnen wird, 
worauf die späteren Aufzeichnungen 
immer mehr vorherrschen, treten die 
Stadien in Kierkegaards innerer Ge­
schichte nicht genügend klar und 
deutlich hervor. Die sorgfältig aus­
gewählten Texte beleuchten aber 
zentrale Themen Kierkegaards von 
verschiedenen Seiten. Auch die kur­
zen Einleitungen zu den verschiede­
nen Themen-kreisen zeigen, dass der 
Herausgeber ein Kenner der Gedan­
kenwelt Kierkegaards ist, der auch 
im Stande war, das gegenwärtig Be­
deutsame besonders zu berücksich­
tigen.
Ein Anhang des Buches enthält 
eine Auswahl von Texten, die einen 
Eindruck von der Aktualität Kier­
kegaards geben, indem Auszüge aus 
Aeusserungen einiger Philosophen 
und Dichter über Kierkegaard zi­
tiert sind. Zu begrüssen ist es, dass 
auch die Dichter berücksichtigt wer­
den. Die wichtige Einwirkung Kier­
kegaards auf zahlreiche deutsch­
sprachige Dichter des 20. Jahrhun­
derts ist ein von der Forschung 
bisher ziemlich vernachlässigtes 
Thema.
Steffen Steffensen
KIERKEGAARD A N D  
H UM AN-VALUES
BIBLIOTHECA KIERK EG AARDIANA
Vol. 7. Edited by Niels Thulstrup and M. 
M ikulovä Tbulstrup. Copenhagen: C. A. 
Reitzels Boghandel, 1980, 164 pp.
Der Inhalt des Bandes besteht wie in 
den übrigen der Serie grossenteils aus 
Artikeln, die ursprünglich für die 
gescheiterte Kierkegaard-Encyclo- 
paedie bestimmt waren, was die 
konzentrierte Kürze mancher dieser 
Beiträge erklärt. Je umfassender das 
behandelte Thema ist, desto unbe­
friedigender ist in vielen Fällen eine 
solche Kürze. So war es z.B. wohl 
nicht zu vermeiden, dass manches 
Wichtige in Sören Holms Artikel 
über das 19. Jahrhundert unberück­
sichtigt bleiben musste. Søren Holm 
ist übrigens der irrigen Ansicht, die 
Aesthetiker in Entweder-Oder seien 
als Vertreter der Romantik aufzu­
fassen. Dies ist ein Irrtum, den man 
auch bei anderen dänischen Kierke­
gaardforschern findet. Man muss 
sehen, dass diese Aesthetiker Vertre­
ter der damaligen europäischen pes­
simistisch-nihilistischen Zeitströ­
mung sind. Ihre nächsten Verwand­
ten in Deutschland findet man bei 
Dichtern wie Büchner, Heine und 
Lenau. Der spieen dieser Aesthetiker 
hat weder enge Beziehungen zum 
Taugenichts Eichendorffs, auf den 
Holm verweist, noch zur Lucinde 
Fr. Schlegels.
Mehrere der Beiträge geben, dieses
muss auch gesagt werden, trotz der 
Kürze wertvolle Informationen oder 
zeichnen Perspektiven, die ein adä­
quates Verständnis der Kierkegaard­
texte erleichtern können. Dies gilt 
z.B. von den beiden Artikeln über 
den Angstbegriff. P. Lönning 
schreibt über den Angstbegriff bei 
Kierkegaard, W. v. Kloeden über 
Kierkegaards Vorläufer und die 
Verwendung des Angstbegriffs bei 
späteren Philosophen und Psycholo­
gen. Zu den Vorläufern Kierke­
gaards darf man wohl auch Ha­
mann rechnen. Im Begriff Angst, 
dessen Motto Hamann erwähnt, zi­
tiert jedenfalls Vigilius Haufniensis 
eine Stelle bei Hamann über die 
Angst (SV IV, 472). Wertvoll sind 
auch die kleinen Artikel von K. 
Nordentoft, besonders der etwas 
längere über »Erotic Love«. Nor­
dentoft hat es vermocht, in seinem 
Buch Kierkegaards Psykologi (Kø­
benhavn 1972) der Kierkegaardfor­
schung neue Anregungen zu geben, 
offenbar weil er sich ausserhalb der 
gewöhnlichen Geleise dieser Forsch­
ung bewegt. U. A. sieht man bei 
Nordentoft, wie sehr Kierkegaard 
Einsichten der späteren Tiefenpsy­
chologie vorweggenommen hat, was 
auch der dänische Schriftsteller 
Villy Sørensen weiss, der in seiner 
Literaturauffassung von Kierke­
gaard beeinflusst ist.
Hervorgehoben seien auch Bei­
träge wie Per Lönnings über »Expe­
rience«, P. R. Sponheims über »Res-
ponsibility«, Fr.-Eb Wilde über 
»Decision« und N. H. Soes über 
»Anthropology«. Diese geben zu­
verlässige Orientierung über zentrale 
Themen Kierkegaards, die oft ein­
gehend von der Kierkegaard­
forschung behandelt wurden. Fr.-Eb. 
Wilde hat einen beachtlichen Beitrag 
geschrieben über Kierkegaard und 
»Established Order« (Det Bestaa- 
ende), ein in der Kierkegaard-for- 
schung keineswegs genügend erhell­
tes Thema. Ich vermisse aber in die­
sem und anderen Beiträgen die Ein­
sicht in die Bedeutung der Tatsache, 
dass Kierkegaard von Anfang an 
sein Zeitalter als eine Zeit der Auf­
lösung erlebt hat. So ist es verständ­
lich, dass ihm zunächst die Aufgabe 
der Kirche wichtig ist. Die Wende 
tritt bei der immer stärker werden­
den Erkenntnis ein, dass auch die 
Kirche von den Auflösungstenden­
zen der Zeit geprägt ist, so dass dem 
späteren Kierkegaard der Kampf 
gegen die Fälschung des wahren 
Christentums die Forderung des 
Tages wird und das »Bestehende« in 
der Christenheit eine negative Be­
deutung erhält.
Für sich stehen die beiden letzten 
innerlich verwandten Beiträge, C. 
Fabros über »Desperation« und Frau 
M. Mikulovä Thulstrups über »Suf- 
fering«. C. Fabro betont die nach 
seiner Ansicht engen Beziehungen zu 
katholischer Frömmigkeit und My­
stik. Was sein Thema betrifft, war 
die Verzweiflung wohl immer bei
Kierkegaard die eigentliche Sünde, 
die Empörung im Unglauben gegen 
Gott. Solche fundamentalen Einsich­
ten sind bei Kierkegaard nicht von 
irgendeiner Lektüre entscheidend be­
stimmt, sie haben tiefpersönliche 
V or aussetzungen.
Besteht eine enge Verwandtschaft 
zwischen der Auffassung des Chri­
stentums bei Kierkegaard und der 
Mystik, wie Frau Thulstrup in ihrem 
Artikel behauptet? Man muss in 
solchen Fragen genau sein. Es sei 
deshalb zunächst festgestellt, dass 
für jede eigentliche Mystik das Er­
lebnis der unio mystica wesentlich 
ist. aDmit ist auch der fundamentale 
Unterschied zwischen der Mystik 
und der ausgesprochen dualistischen 
Christentumauffassung Kierke­
gaards bezeichnet. Immer wieder hat 
Kierkegaard die unbedingte Un­
gleichheit zwischen Gott und 
Mensch hervorgehoben, was auch 
vom Gottmenschen in Vergleich mit 
jedem anderen Menschen gilt. »Der 
Geist verbietet jede direkte Unmit­
telbarkeit«, sagt deshalb nAti-Cli- 
macus in der Einübung. So kann es 
nicht wundern, dass wir in Ent­
weder-Oder eine ausführliche heis­
sende Kritik der Mystik finden, die 
ohne Zweifel weitgehend mit Kier­
kegaards eigenen Gesichtspunkten 
übereinstimmt (SV II, 263).
Eine der wichtigsten Fragen der 
Kierkegaardforschung ist das Ver­
hältnis des späteren Kierkegaard 
zum früheren. Hier gehen die Mei­
nungen weit auseinander. Man löst 
aber dieses Problem nicht, indem 
man Kierkegaard als einen Mystiker 
auffasst, der nicht die letzten Spros­
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Bogen sætter den velkendte og meget 
omdiskuterede forlovelse i et nyt, 
kønspolitisk perspektiv. 1. kapitel er 
en genfortælling af dramaet, skrevet 
i bevæget tone, dog strengt, med 
gentagne advarsler mod enhver, som 
ville vove at følge Kierkegaards 
skrækkelige eksempel. Forlovelses­
historien bliver først placeret i dens 
umiddelbare historiske sammen­
hæng, 1800-tallets København, for 
straks derefter at blive belyst ud fra 
hele vor så konsekvent og så ubarm­
hjertigt kvindehadske og kvinde­
undertrykkende verdenshistorie. 
Særligt dvæler han ved kristendom­
mens katastrofale bidrag til forbry­
delsen.
Ud fra Engels og Freuds teorier 
om patriarkatets oprindelse (s. 86ff.) 
fordyber Thielst sig nu i denne hi­
storiens gruopvækkende sammen­
sværgelse, dette uhyre komplot, som
kun har bevæget sig i én retning, har 
haft ét eneste formål for øje: at ud­
slette kvinden.
Til sidst vender han tilbage til ud­
gangspunktet, til patienten Kierke- 
gaard. Denne person, hvis synder 
(»for reflekteret og intellektualise- 
ret«, »for tidsbundet«, »for meget 
overjeg« m.v.) bliver opregnet i ka­
pitel 2, havde dog efterladt sig et 
værk. Thielst kan lige nå at foretage 
en hurtig »1. rundvisning i forfat­
terskabet«. Næste stadium, foreslår 
han, må blive en egentlig, kønspoli­
tisk nærlæsning.
Bogen vrimler med dagens kode- 
gloser og -fraser sammenknyttet med 
et større antal videnskabelige frem­
medord. Disse sidste bliver dog, til 
trøst for den ubefarne læser, forkla­
ret, ligesom teksten er forsynet med 
en mængde encyklopædiske oplys­
ninger. Terminologien kulminerer 
med den nyeste rubrik, trylleordet 
»knudemand« som nøgle til forstå­
else af Kierkegaards psyke, der efter 
forfatteren ikke afviger væsentlig 
fra den gængse mandschauvinists 
syndige sjæl.
Sproget er ellers intimt, fortroligt 
med læseren, blomstrende med de 
patetiske udtryk, som bedst egner sig 
til at bevæge søsterskabet, det så 
uretfærdigt behandlede.
Nogle spredte vredens udråb 
krydrer stilen. Ingen bliver skånet, 
hverken samtidens profeter eller 
Apostelen. En af Freuds kønspolitisk 
uheldige udtalelser bliver afsløret
(s. 96) som det »fantastiske reaktio­
nære vås«, den var, og Korinterbre- 
vene erklæres (s. 103) forfattet af en 
»træls sexualneurotisk mandschau­
vinist« -  hvad man dog også har 
hørt før.
For det meste benytter forfatteren 
sig ellers af den akademisk beher­
skede stil, med al den abstraktion og 
uigennemtrængelighed, den også kan 
medføre (som f.eks. i formationen: 
»de kompensatoriske sublimerings­
evners kreative muligheder ...« s. 
126). Til andre tider moraliserer han 
med en dyb bekymring, som er 
grundlagt på solid menneskekund­
skab og profetisk forudseenhed med 
tilbagevirkende kraft. Dette udtryk­
ker sig ved hyppige brug af adver­
biet »desværre« og en suveræn kon­
ditionalis: »Havde han (K.) evnet 
at se tingene gennem et udviklings­
psykologisk og -historisk filter, ville 
han have undgået den kønspolitiske 
dogmatisering« (s. 131).
Når vreden og bekymringen har 
lagt sig, kan der godt gives plads for 
finere nuancer og distinktioner, som 
f.eks. når han skal til at definere 
Kierkegaards eksakte type inden for 
mandschauvinismens sfære: den var, 
siges det s. 81, ikke traditionel, hel­
ler ikke klassisk, men civiliseret.
Hovedformålet med bogen er pæ­
dagogisk: vogt jer for undertrykke­
ren. Forordets afsværgelse af al »pe­
danteri og hypervidenskabelighed« 
fritager Kierkegaard-kenderen for at 
læse bogen efter indholdet og forby­
der anmelderen enhver kritisk trang.
Man kan konstatere, at det eneste 
hos Kierkegaard, som vækker for­
fatterens absolutte respekt, er orto­
grafien, et ikke ubetydeligt hensyn 
i vore dage.
Hvad kvindekampens bastioner 
angår: ingen alarm. Man kan fortsat 
roligt græde over den spildte mælk,
begræde Regine samt alle kongelige 
spøgelser, som ikke kan anvises 
plads i den travle og tætbefolkede, 
bedrevidende og absolut emancipe­
rede nutid.
Sophia Scopetéa
(Anmeldelsen har tidligere været offentlig­
gjort i W eekendavisen. Berlingske A ften , 
19. september 1980.)
